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Does Motor Simulation Theory
Explain the Cognitive Mechanisms
Underlying Motor Imagery? A Critical
Review
Helen O’Shea* and Aidan Moran
School of Psychology, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
Motor simulation theory (MST; Jeannerod, 2001) purports to explain how various action-
related cognitive states relate to actual motor execution. Specifically, it proposes that
motor imagery (MI; imagining an action without executing the movements involved)
shares certain mental representations and mechanisms with action execution, and
hence, activates similar neural pathways to those elicited during the latter process.
Furthermore, MST postulates that MI works by rehearsing neural motor systems off-line
via a hypothetical simulation process. In this paper, we review evidence cited in support
of MST and evaluate its efficacy in understanding the cognitive mechanisms underlying
MI. In doing so, we delineate the precise postulates of simulation theory and clarify
relevant terminology. Based on our cognitive-level analysis, we argue firstly that the
psychological mechanisms underlying MI are poorly understood and require additional
conceptual and empirical analysis. In addition, we identify a number of potentially fruitful
lines of inquiry for future investigators of MST and MI.
Keywords: simulation theory, motor imagery, motor cognition, functional equivalence, embodied cognition,
emulation
INTRODUCTION
Motor simulation theory (MST; hereafter, simulation theory; Jeannerod, 1994, 2001, 2006a) offers
a seminal explanation for how various action-related cognitive states such as “motor imagery”
(MI; the mental rehearsal of actions without engaging in the movements involved; Moran et al.,
2012), action intention (the translation of a desired movement into behavior; Haggard, 2005) and
observation, are related to actual motor execution (ME) states. The cornerstone of MST is the idea
that cognitive motor states activate motor systems in the brain that are similar to those triggered
during actual action (Jeannerod, 2001, 2004, 2006a). Further, these motor systems can be rehearsed
off-line via a putative simulation mechanism which allows the mind to anticipate action viability
and potential action outcomes (Jeannerod, 2001). Similar neural activation during motor cognition
and ME is assumed to occur because both states share motor representations in the mind – the
idea that actions are internally (or mentally) generated according to a specific goal and in the
absence of external environmental cues (i.e., the theory of action representation, see Jeannerod,
1994, 2004, 2006b; Pearson and Kosslyn, 2015). Specifically, MI and ME “are both assigned to
the same motor representation vehicle” (Jeannerod, 1994, p. 190) with the representation being
the “covert counterpart of any goal-directed action, executed or not” (Jeannerod, 2006a, p. 165).
This correspondence between ‘simulated’ and executed action led to the ‘functional equivalence’
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hypothesis (Jeannerod, 1994, 2001, 2006a), which maintains that
“motor imagery . . . should involve, in the subject’s motor brain,
neural mechanisms similar to those operating during the real
action” (Jeannerod, 2001, pp. S103–S104).
At first glance, MST proposes a fertile hypothetical mechanism
(“simulation”) that offers intriguing insights into motor
cognition (e.g., see Grush, 2004; Gentsch et al., 2016) and
the neurocomputational parallels between imagination and
action (e.g., Conson et al., 2009; Case et al., 2015). On closer
inspection, however, MST is hampered by problems arising
from the inadequate specification of key postulates. For example,
Jeannerod (2006a) claimed that “represented actions should
involve a simulation of the mechanisms that normally participate
in the various stages of action generation, including motor
execution” (p. 130). However, these potential mechanisms are
rarely delineated and when they are (e.g., see the schematic
diagrams of action representations and associated texts,
Jeannerod, 2004, 2006a), their precise operational details are
rather vague.
In view of this problem of unclear mechanisms, the purpose
of the present paper is twofold. Firstly, we aim to specify the
main postulates of MST and to evaluate the evidence available
to support them. Secondly, and more specifically, we wish
to examine the adequacy of MST in explaining the cognitive
mechanisms that underlie MI. In order to achieve these two
objectives, the paper is organized as follows. To begin with, we
shall explore Jeannerod’s understanding of simulation. This task
requires analysis of different usages of the term simulation and
a brief evaluation of alternative theories of MI. Following this,
we present key postulates of MST and evaluate the evidence that
supports them – although space restrictions preclude an in-depth
analysis of the substantial research literature in question here.
The next section will focus on the implications of simulation
theory for understanding the cognitive mechanisms underlying
MI. Here, we will consider the extent to which simulation theory
is sufficient for explaining MI, and, if not, whether we should
turn to other relevant conceptual approaches, such as emulation
and grounded theories. We shall end by briefly sketching some
aspects of MST that require further research. Although our paper
builds on previous reviews of simulation-related topics (e.g., see
Munzert et al., 2009; Pezzulo et al., 2013; Ridderinkhof and
Brass, 2015), it differs from them in its critical evaluation of
key postulates of MST and also in its consideration of possible
cognitive mechanisms underlying MI.
SIMULATION, EMULATION, AND
EMBODIED THEORIES OF MI
The term simulation has many referents in social and motor
cognition domains. As the former have been discussed elsewhere
(e.g., Shanton and Goldman, 2010; Gallagher, 2015), they fall
outside the scope of our review. However, within the motor
cognition domain, simulation was postulated by Jeannerod
(2006a) to mean “the oﬄine rehearsal of neural networks” (p.
129), and “activation of the motor system is a prerequisite
for the simulation theory” (Jeannerod, 2001, p. S104). Other
researchers, however, use the term with different emphasis. For
example, simulation as conceptualized by grounded theories, is
multimodal (not just motoric) and operates to achieve particular
conceptual knowledge. Specifically, it is the re-enactment of
previously experienced modal states (i.e., perceptual, motor,
introspective, and proprioceptive states), which are held in
memory as a multimodal representation (e.g., arising from
stroking a dog; Barsalou, 2008), by using multiple concurrent
modal simulations to acquire specific conceptual knowledge
(e.g., concept of dog; Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Decety and Grèzes,
2006). Alternatively, the term simulation is used in terms of
anticipatory-associative mechanisms rather than internal models
or representations, and denote the idea that when an action
is simulated it activates the same neural motor systems as
it would during actual action, which then activate associative
mechanisms facilitating sensory simulation (Hesslow, 2002,
2012). Anticipatory mechanisms are key to the simulation
process, in that, the anticipated sensory consequences that arise
from the preparatory stages of movement (including global goal
stages) are associated with action simulation that prompts the
next action . . . and so on (Hesslow, 2002). Thus, anticipatory
and association processes ensure that continuous simulation
occurs. Although both grounded (e.g., Barsalou, 2008) and
association (Hesslow, 2002, 2012) simulation theories have not
as yet been directly related to MI processes, each can broadly
account for MI experience. Specifically, grounded and association
simulation accounts contend that motor simulation can occur
in the absence of external input, relying on the re-enactment
of previously experienced events which are stored in multi-
modal representational format (grounded theories) or previously
reinforced associations (association simulation).
Let us now move from the meaning of simulation to the
attempt to explain MI. Early theories of MI focused on explaining
it in terms of the action-enhancement phenomenon of “mental
practice” (MP; or the “cognitive rehearsal of a task in the
absence of overt physical movement”; Driskell et al., 1994,
p. 481; see also Di Rienzo et al., 2016). They posited that MI
results in a faint innervation of key muscles involved in action
execution which improves their strength, velocity, or control
(psychoneuromuscular accounts; see Driskell et al., 1994; Guillot
et al., 2007); or in the strengthening of motor representations
through the cognitive organization of movement-element coding
and binding (symbolic accounts; Driskell et al., 1994; Schack,
2004). Modern explanations of how MI works are more
mechanistic, however, and largely centre on the theoretical
concept of “forward modeling” in motor control theory (see,
e.g., Wolpert et al., 1995; Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001) or
embodied/grounded cognition (e.g., Wilson, 2002; Barsalou,
2008; Borghi and Cimatti, 2010). Regarding the latter, evidence
exists that the body is (subliminally) involved during off-line
motor cognitive states such as MI, thereby giving simulation an
embodied dimension (e.g., through physiological activity, see,
e.g., Collet and Guillot, 2010; Stinear, 2010). However, while
motor images have sometimes been referred to as embodied
mental states (Jeannerod, 2006a), there are more formal ideas
of what embodiment is (see Wilson, 2002; Borghi and Cimatti,
2010). Typically, embodiment theories maintain that cognition
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does not exclusively rely on internal representations (or, at
the extreme end, considers whether they even exist), as they
place at their core the body’s interaction with the world and
how this shapes the mind (Wilson, 2002). Thus, these theories
claim that cognition, knowledge, and sensorimotor experience
and information are tightly interconnected (Holt and Beilock,
2006). MST conceptualizes MI as a simulation of the covert or
representational stage of the same executed action, and in this
regard, appears incompatible with embodied cognition. To our
knowledge, embodiment theories have yet to conceptualize MI
within the framework.
Regarding the forward modeling of motor control theories,
during action execution, temporal delays in sensory feedback
interfere with the motor system’s ability to accurately control
movement trajectory and kinematics (Wolpert and Ghahramani,
2000). To compensate for such delays, the consequences of
an action are believed to be predicted, using an internal
forward model of the motor-to-sensory transformation (i.e.,
efference copy of the motor command), which facilitates the
formulation of sequential motor commands in the absence
of actual sensory feedback (e.g., Wolpert and Ghahramani,
2000). Drawing on the concept of predictive forward modeling,
emulation theory posits a specific type of simulation – a
predictive process operating during MI that goes beyond
MST’s simulation of efferent motor centres (motor-to-sensory
transformation; Grush, 2004; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009).
Simulation according to MST rehearses the motor system and
is guided exclusively by internal motor representations, whereas
in emulation theory, motor and sensory systems are emulated
in parallel (Grush, 2004). According to emulation theory, during
MI, the efference copy of the motor command (forward model)
drives body/environment emulators (i.e., motor and sensory
representations) in order to simulate movement, proprioception,
and kinesthesis. Accordingly, processes that are assumed to
beneficially operate as adaptive motor control mechanisms
during action execution are exploited in action imagination
(Grush, 2004). Emulation theory posits that action execution
(via efferent motor centres, albeit inhibited) and predicted action
consequences are not sufficient for MI to arise. Instead, as
MI is considered to involve a motor plan and proprioceptive
and kinesthetic feelings, emulation specifies the need to also
simulate the afferent sensory systems (thereby predicting sensory
feedback). We will further discuss emulation theory after we
discuss the postulates of, and evidence for, MST. It is important
to note that all of the aforementioned accounts of simulation and
current theories of MI highlight the interconnectedness between
cognition and sensorimotor experience and information.
POSTULATES OF MOTOR SIMULATION
THEORY
Surprisingly, for such a widely cited theory, the key postulates of
MST have not been summarized in one single publication to date.
To fill this gap, the three central tenets of simulation theory are
summarized below along with the evidence available to support
them. As research employing a simulation theoretical framework
is extensive, however, we will not engage in an in-depth analysis
of this literature. Instead, we merely highlight salient findings that
contribute to the discussion. Further, as a specific focus of the
review is to understand a MST account of MI, this section will
draw on literature referring specifically to this particular cognitive
motor state (rather than to those of related states such as action
observation; see Eaves et al., 2016).
A fundamental assumption of simulation theory is that action
is preceded by the activation of a mental representation which
contains most aspects of the future action. Thus, the mental
representation of the motor action and that of the actual action
form a continuum whereby the represented movement unfolds
over time before culminating in eventual execution (Jeannerod,
1994, 2001, 2004; see Table 1 for postulates). Accordingly, MST
proposes that action information is represented and processed
centrally and includes most of the content of an executed action,
that is, its goal, plan, motor program and consequences. MST
further claims that represented actions (i.e., all covert actions,
e.g., MI) can function off-line (i.e., cognitively) by using the same
mechanisms as actual action – except that execution is inhibited.
This is possible as the motor system is part of cognitive network
(Jeannerod, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2006a). Such a claim implies,
firstly, that the motor system in the brain is involved during
motor cognition, secondly, that neural activity observed during
executed action is similar to that observed during represented
action, thirdly, a functional equivalence between cognitive motor
states, such as MI, and actual actions (i.e., both have a causal
role in generating action), and finally, that inhibitory mechanisms
operate to prevent overt movement during action representation.
EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE CLAIMS
OF MOTOR SIMULATION THEORY
Several lines of investigation have been employed to explore
the claims of simulation theory. These empirical strands
include neurophysiological studies mapping brain activity
during cognitive motor states and ME, neuropsychological and
physiological studies exploring correlations between the different
motor states, the effects of MI on subsequent motor performance,
and empirical studies (largely employing mental chronometry
paradigms). Compelling evidence that action representations
exist as purely mental states that reside in and activate neural
motor systems oﬄine comes from neurophysiological and
physiological investigations of the correspondences between
TABLE 1 | Key postulates of simulation theory.
(1) Real action comprises a covert (representational) – overt (execution)
continuum, where the covert/representational stage contains most aspects
of the future action, that is, the goal, motor plan/program, and its
consequences (Jeannerod, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006a).
(2) Action representations can operate off-line, via a simulation mechanism, as
the motor system is part of a cognitive network (Jeannerod, 2001, 2006a).
3) Represented (i.e., covert) actions rely on the same set of mechanisms as
the real action they simulate, except that execution is inhibited (Jeannerod,
2004, 2006a).
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actual and imagined actions (see, e.g., Collet et al., 2011; Hétu
et al., 2013). Firstly, peripheral physiological measures, such as
skin resistance, cardiovascular and respiratory rates, eye blinking
activity and electromyography (EMG) activity have been found
to correlate between actual and imagined movements (e.g.,
Boschker, 2001; Guillot and Collet, 2005a; Guillot et al., 2007;
Papadelis et al., 2007; Collet et al., 2011). For example, during
MI, cardiovascular and respiratory rates have been shown to
increase proportionately with escalations in running speed on a
treadmill (Decety et al., 1991). As physiological measures reflect
autonomic activation which is largely outside voluntary control,
their presence during MI indicates that they have a central
origin (i.e., representational), and their similarity between ME
and MI suggests that both movement types have comparable
representational content (Jeannerod, 2006a).
Recent neuroimaging and analytical (e.g., functional
connectivity methods; for review, see Westlake and Nagarajan,
2011) advances facilitate neural-level investigation that produces
nuanced and sophisticated data regarding the neural organization
underlying actual and imagined (i.e., represented) actions.
Table 2 summarizes the key anatomical structures typically
involved during MI, in relation to those involved during ME (for
overview of neuroanatomical regions generally associated with
action execution, see, e.g., Tanji and Hoshi, 2008; Gallivan and
Culham, 2015). As indicated in the table, research demonstrates
that MI and ME share brain regions, namely, the PFC (including
anterior cingulate cortex), pre-motor cortex (PMC), SMA,
posterior parietal cortex (PPC), primary motor cortex (M1;
although not consistently, see e.g., Lotze and Halsband, 2006;
Munzert et al., 2009), cerebellum and the basal ganglia (see
Jeannerod, 1995, 2001; Lotze et al., 1999; Grèzes and Decety,
2001; Munzert et al., 2009; Hétu et al., 2013; Lotze, 2013; Jiang
et al., 2015; Ridderinkhof and Brass, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016).
Further, studies exploring the characteristics of the motor system
during brain resting state (RS), MI, and ME reveal a functional
connectivity between PMC, SMA, and M1 during RS and ME
in healthy participants (Bajaj et al., 2014) and during MI, ME,
and RS in stroke patients (Bajaj et al., 2015). Interestingly, higher
functional connectivity between prefrontal-parietal regions at RS
results in greater activation in those areas during an imagined
motor task (Saiote et al., 2016). Common active brain regions
provide support for the claim that the motor system is part
of a cognitive network, it is involved during MI, and that this
involvement closely reflects that of ME. However, it should
be noted that while evidence of common active brain regions
during MI and ME supports the claims of MST, it also provides
support for alternative theoretical explanations of MI, such as
emulation or grounded simulations (Grush, 2004; Barsalou,
2008). The latter two similarly conceptualize simulation as being
contingent on activity in the motor system – for the emulation or
re-enactment (grounded) of motor states.
Studies examining the distributed nature of the neural
networks involved during ME and MI have identified subtle
differences in their underlying motor pathways. A shift in neural
activity has been demonstrated in the parietal cortex from higher
volumes at anterior loci (primary sensory area; S1) during
actual action, to higher volumes at more posterior loci during
MI (particularly IPL; Gerardin et al., 2000; Hétu et al., 2013;
see Table 2). Increased activation in the PPC during MI, in
relation to ME, reflects its pure representational quality, as this
region, particularly the left IPL, is associated with the generation
and storage of motor representations (Andersen and Buneo,
2002; Creem-Regehr, 2009; Gallivan and Culham, 2015). Further,
regarding the SMA, activity during MI is greatest in the pre-
SMA (rostral) whereas during ME, activity is more confined
to the SMA proper (more caudal; e.g., Stephan et al., 1995;
Gerardin et al., 2000; Kuhtz-Buschbeck et al., 2003; Wang et al.,
2010). The pre-SMA projects to the dlPFC and is associated with
higher-order cognitive motor processes, such as conscious action
intention, motor control, selection, sequencing, and preparation
(Cunnington et al., 1996; Lehéricy et al., 2004; Lau et al., 2006;
Nachev et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2010). The fact that the dlPFC
(Stephan et al., 1995; Gerardin et al., 2000; Hanakawa et al., 2003;
Kuhtz-Buschbeck et al., 2003; Hétu et al., 2013) and the inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG; see Jeannerod, 2006a) typically display greater
activity during MI than during ME, highlights a distinction
between the two action states, and challenges the claim that
represented actions rely on the same mechanisms as the real
action they simulate. Further, research demonstrates that while
MI and ME activate dorsal networks connecting frontal-parietal
regions, MI further activates ventral networks linking prefrontal-
parietal regions (Vry et al., 2012). Distinct activity may reflect
a greater requirement during MI for attentive awareness for
maintaining information in mind (dlPFC) and inhibition of overt
movement (IFG; Frith and Dolan, 1996; Pochon et al., 2001; Aron
et al., 2003).
It is also worth noting that a trend of weaker neural
activity during MI than during ME is generally reported in
neuroimaging and effective connectivity studies (e.g., Lotze et al.,
1999; Jeannerod, 2001; Stippich et al., 2002; Dechent et al.,
2004; Solodkin et al., 2004; Gao et al., 2011; Sharma and Baron,
2013; Avanzino et al., 2015). This trend may reflect concurrent
inhibitory processes which prevent action execution during MI,
which would be consistent with the postulate of MST that ME and
MI share common representations and activate similar neural
motor systems, only movement execution is inhibited during MI
(Jeannerod, 2001, 2006a).
If represented actions rely on the same mechanisms as
ME then it is expected that damage to part of the motor
system would similarly impair or prevent both action states
(Jeannerod, 2001). Neuropsychological evidence demonstrates
that the fronto-parietal network must be intact to perform
accurate and effective MI (e.g., Schwoebel et al., 2002; McInnes
et al., 2016; Oostra et al., 2016), and ME (e.g., Sirigu et al.,
2004; Nachev et al., 2008). Further, interruption to the IPL (via
transcranial magnetic stimulation, TMS, or injury) significantly
reduces or destroys the ability to generate accurate motor images
(Sirigu et al., 1996; Gerardin et al., 2000; Guillot et al., 2008; Buch
et al., 2012; Lebon et al., 2012; McInnes et al., 2016; Saiote et al.,
2016), acquire MI-based skill (Kraeutner et al., 2016), modify
ineffective actual actions (Sirigu et al., 2004), or coordinate actual
movements (see McInnes et al., 2016). It seems therefore, that
the PPC is crucial for effective MI and ME, with both behaviors
relying on the region’s functional properties, most likely for
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 February 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 72
fnhum-11-00072 February 15, 2017 Time: 13:30 # 5
O’Shea and Moran Motor Simulation Theory and Motor Imagery
TABLE 2 | Key anatomical brain regions associated with MI and Motor Execution (ME).
Anatomical region MI ME Selected reference
dlPFC Active Active Gerardin et al., 2000; Hanakawa et al., 2003; Kuhtz-Buschbeck
et al., 2003; Hétu et al., 2013
SMA Greater activity in rostral SMA
Active pre-SMA
Active SMA No activity in
pre-SMA
Stephan et al., 1995; Gerardin et al., 2000; Kuhtz-Buschbeck
et al., 2003; Vry et al., 2012
PMC Active Active Gerardin et al., 2000; Hanakawa et al., 2003; Munzert et al.,
2009
Par Greater activity in PPC and IPL Greater activity in S1 Gerardin et al., 2000; Hanakawa et al., 2003; Hétu et al., 2013;
Saiote et al., 2016
M1 Weak activation Active Munzert et al., 2009; Sharma and Baron, 2013; Bajaj et al.,
2015; Saiote et al., 2016
Cerebellum Greater activity caudally Greater activity rostrally Hanakawa et al., 2003; Ridderinkhof and Brass, 2015
Basal Ganglia Active rostral caudate nucleus Active caudal putamen Gerardin et al., 2000; Hétu et al., 2013
Par, parietal cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; PPC, posterior parietal cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; PMC, premotor cortex; SMA, supplementary motor
cortex; S1, primary somatosensory cortex; M1, primary motor cortex; d, dorsal; l, lateral.
action intention processes (Sirigu et al., 2004; Tunik et al., 2007)
and the generation of motor representations (Rushworth et al.,
2003).
From the analysis above, it is apparent that a vast quantity
of neural-level research within the simulation theoretical
framework has contributed to identification of key neural
circuitry underlying MI. Interpreting this evidence in general
terms, we cautiously conclude that although MI and ME
processes share certain brain regions relating to the motor system,
the specific motor networks underlying these motor behaviors
are not identical. Subtle but important differences exist, and
these differences may relate to processes that are necessary
and specific to each movement type/behavior. However, as the
precise cognitive processes supporting MI have not, as yet, been
delineated, any region – process/function associations in the
context of MI are tentative.
Additional insight into the validity of the claims of MST
may be gained from behavioral-level research, and in particular
that employing mental chronometry paradigms (for reviews,
see e.g., Guillot and Collet, 2005b; Guillot et al., 2012a; Moran
and Toner, 2017). These paradigms assume that temporal
indices (i.e., the time-course of information-processing behavior)
can elucidate the underlying cognitive representations and
mechanisms of behavior (Posner, 1978). Studies employing the
mental chronometry paradigm demonstrate similar performance
durations for actual and imagined actions during automatic
(Decety and Michel, 1989; Maruff and Velakoulis, 2000;
Papaxanthis et al., 2002) and cyclical (e.g., pedalo rowing,
Munzert, 2002) movements, and during movements governed
by physical laws such as Fitts’ law (i.e., speed-accuracy trade off,
Decety and Jeannerod, 1996; Cerritelli et al., 2000). Congruence
between the timing of actual and imagined movements
suggests that the representational content, including motor
rules (e.g., Fitts’ Law), and information-processing mechanisms
underpinning actual action and motor representational states are
similar.
In passing, a note of caution about mental chronometry
paradigms in MI research is warranted. Specifically, they provide
data only on the similarity of information processing occurring
overall during ME and MI, and do not offer insight into the
processing specifics involved. For example, mental chronometry
methods offer information about the timing of mental processing
but no information regarding the accuracy of MI processes (e.g.,
Guillot and Collet, 2005a). Currently, other than duration, we do
not know exactly what mental chronometry actually measures
during MI. This matter is significant considering that temporal
inconsistencies between ME and MI have also been demonstrated
in several contexts (see Guillot and Collet, 2005b; Guillot et al.,
2012a), specifically, during complex tasks (Decety et al., 1989;
Calmels et al., 2006; O’Shea and Moran, 2016), bimanual tasks
(Dahm and Rieger, 2016), and tasks that involve added mass
(Decety et al., 1989; Cerritelli et al., 2000). Further, expertise
appears to be a factor in observations of temporal congruence,
with experts achieving greater correspondence between actual
and imagined movement performance times than novices (Reed,
2002). However, expert performers in music have also been found
to exhibit temporal incongruence when a complex, bimanual task
is involved (O’Shea and Moran, 2016). Thus, differences in actual
and imagined performance durations may reflect distinctions in
how the content of the action representation is processed (e.g.,
automatic vs. controlled), the amount of processing required
(Dahm and Rieger, 2016), or differences in representational
content (Frank et al., 2014; Schack et al., 2014). It is likely that
experienced actions are represented more sparsely (i.e., the strong
activation of a small neural population; Desimone, 1996) which
may contribute to reduced performance times (due to neural
efficiency), or reduced levels of necessary attentional control (due
to increased automaticity of processes; see, Debarnot et al., 2014).
This is an area that requires further empirical investigation to
decipher the precise mechanisms contributing to or underlying
experience effects in MI.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON
SUPPORT FOR SIMULATION THEORY
The preceding neural, neuropsychological, and behavioral
findings converge to suggest that executed actions and cognitive
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motor states such as MI have a close correspondence. Specifically,
both movement types appear to rely on similar mental
representations that are embedded in neural motor systems,
and both seem to have a causal role in generating actions
through their activation of the motor system. MST offers
a mechanism (i.e., simulation) for the functioning of action
representations (e.g., MI), thereby relating cognitive motor states,
such as MI, to actual action. MI has oftentimes been viewed as
empirically intractable due its covert nature. However, neural-
level investigation has brought imagery research into the realm
of tangible, observable knowledge (e.g., see MacKisack et al.,
2016). Further, such investigations have markedly increased over
the past 15 years (see Di Rienzo et al., 2016). However, we
propose that without understanding the cognitive organization
and precise operational mechanisms of MI, any attempt to
map its functional subcomponents in the brain is likely to
be premature (but see Poldrack and Yarkoni, 2016, for some
interesting new ideas about how informatics-based approaches
can facilitate the delineation of brain-cognition mappings).
Mapping is most meaningful if those subcomponents have been
empirically associated with MI processes (and are not merely
epiphenomenal; for further discussion on the contribution of
neural-level analysis for the advancement of cognitive theory, see
Coltheart, 2013; Mather et al., 2013). Further, as stated earlier,
the discovery of common active brain regions during MI and
ME does not arbitrate empirically between the explanations of
MI offered by MST, emulation theory and grounded theory
(Grush, 2004; Barsalou, 2008). We propose that in order to
fully understand MI, and its underlying mechanisms, we must
understand the cognition that supports it (which incidentally may
also shed light on the precise mechanisms involved in actual
motor control; see de Lange et al., 2008; Verbruggen et al.,
2014).
DOES MST PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE
UNDERSTANDING OF THE COGNITIVE
MECHANISMS UNDERLYING MI?
The simulation mechanism alleged to operate during MI (which
is charged with the task of rehearsing the neural motor system)
has been linked to positive behavioral-level effects, such as
enhanced action performance (for review, see Di Rienzo et al.,
2016) in athletes (e.g., for reviews, see Driskell et al., 1994;
Weinberg, 2008), medicine and rehabilitation (e.g., for review,
see Page, 2000; Malouin and Richards, 2010; Arora et al.,
2011; Schuster et al., 2011; but also see Braun et al., 2013),
musicians (e.g., Ross, 1985; Theiler and Lippman, 1995; Bernardi
et al., 2013) and dancers (Bolles and Chatfield, 2009; Girón
et al., 2012), and modifications of functional connectivity in
the motor system (Pascual-Leone et al., 1995; Lafleur et al.,
2002; Jackson et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2014). Additionally,
impairments in the mechanism may underlie imagery-related
psychopathology (e.g., delusions of control, see e.g., Jeannerod,
2001; PTSD and social anxiety disorder, see e.g., Moran
et al., 2015). MST claims that MI, via simulation of action
representations, “shapes the motor system in anticipation to
execution” and this facilitates the subsequent actual action
(Jeannerod, 2001, p. S103). Such facilitation is proposed as
an explanation for improved movement performance following
MI/MP. However, in this section, we question the extent to
which MST is adequate for the task of explaining exactly how MI
works.
Earlier in the paper, we explained MST’s proposition that
imagined actions are actions, except that they are not executed.
Expanding this idea, Jeannerod claimed that “everything that is
involved in an overt action (i.e., the action goal, plan, motor
program, and action consequences), except for the muscular
contractions” (Jeannerod, 2004, p. 379) and their associated
generated reafferent signals is also contained in the motor
representations/images of MI (Jeannerod, 2001, 2004, 2006a). By
implication, imagining an action is assumed to rely on the same
mechanisms as those involved in actually executing it – except
that overt movement is inhibited (Jeannerod, 2004, 2006a). If this
proposition is valid, then firstly, the cognitive systems supporting
ME should also be largely involved during MI, and secondly, any
effects observed during voluntary movement should be observed
during MI. Further, and perhaps the greatest implication of the
claim of similar representations between ME and MI in MST,
is that in order to maintain its covert status, MI must employ
inhibitory mechanisms.
From the preceding analysis, it seems that MST relies on
a rather ill-defined mechanism – simulation – that is held
to operate during MI to plan, program, monitor, control and
inhibit action, without explaining precisely how it does so,
other than operating the neural motor system. Unfortunately,
researchers applying the MST framework often seek to support
the simulation hypothesis without questioning the nature of
the mechanism itself or the processes that support it. In order
to rectify this problem, we need to investigate how simulation
functions, and whether or not it fully accounts for how MI works.
We also need to identify the set of mechanisms purportedly
simulated. In addressing these issues from Jeannerod’s theoretical
perspective, we propose that the simulation process during MI
serves at least three functions: (i) the selection and assembly of
action elements stored in long term memory (LTM; a memory
system whereby information that cannot be held in immediate,
working memory is stored and exists apart from immediate
cognitive processing; Jeannerod, 1994, 1997, 2006a; Jeneson
and Squire, 2012); (ii) the monitoring of action simulation
activity toward the goal (Jeannerod, 1994, 1997, 2006a); and
(iii) the inhibition of overt movement (Jeannerod, 2001, 2004,
2006a).
Regarding the selection and assembly of action elements,
according to MST, simulation does not merely signify the
reactivation of previously executed actions (held in LTM),
but instead is purported to activate mechanisms that select
and assemble “unspecific elements” of action or schemas
during action planning (Jeannerod, 2006a, p. 134). Jeannerod
(1997, 2006a) suggested that a potential mechanism may
be somewhat like Norman and Shallice’s (1986) ‘supervisory
attentional system’ (SAS) – a control mechanism for biasing
selection processes. Attention is a multifaceted process that
incorporates both inhibitory and facilitatory mechanisms during
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information processing, for actively suppressing distractor
information and enhancing relevant information, respectively
(Tipper, 1985; Kok, 1999). The construct is central to cognitive
neuroscience because it explores the mechanisms by which
“voluntary control and subjective experience arise from and
regulate our behavior” (Posner and Rothbart, 2007, p. 1).
However, in MST, potential attentional mechanisms (i.e., SAS)
are insufficiently examined in relation to action representation
(see Jeannerod, 1997, 2004, 2006a), and nowhere can we
find it directly related to MI. Therefore, the precise role of
attentional mechanisms in MI and the issue of how they
relate to simulation are curiously unclear in MST. It may
be that as simulation is considered to “rehearse the short-
term, fast and automatic unfolding of movement” (Jeannerod,
2006a, p. 140) that the SAS operates in accordance with
the action goal, to actively bias the activation and inhibition
of competing elements and thus control appropriate action
selection. However, it remains unclear as to whether such
an attentional mechanism is solely responsible during MI for
directing attention to action planning operations or is responsible
for other processes – such as action initiation, direction,
monitoring, adjusting, completion, completion verification, or
even for the conscious awareness of (imagined) kinesthetic
sensations typically experienced during MI. It can be noted at
this stage that, according to MST, imagined actions are assembled
from unspecific movement elements, and therefore although this
should facilitate novel action learning using MI, evidence exists
to the contrary – learning does not occur without prior physical
movement experience (Mulder et al., 2004; Olsson and Nyberg,
2010).
According to MST, motor representations/images are
formed prior to execution (recall the representation-execution
continuum), and they include the action goal and anticipated
action effects – anticipated through simulation (Jeannerod,
2006a). Research demonstrates that during actual action
attention modulates (Jones et al., 2013) or enhances the
precision of action-effect prediction and intensifies sensory
information (Kok et al., 2012). Further, attention itself can act
as an anticipatory mechanism (e.g., see, Jones et al., 2013).
Therefore, it is possible that during MI, simulation relies on
attentional mechanisms for predictive processing. To test this
possibility, empirical studies exploring interactions between
attention and MI would be valuable, and would also help to
clarify the role of attention in simulation processes. This line of
investigation could be particularly fruitful given that a typical
effect of voluntary (actual) action is sensory attenuation (i.e.,
where sensory signals are usually attenuated during predicted
actions; see, e.g., Blakemore et al., 1998; Roussel et al., 2013)
rather than intensified sensory information (which can arise
from attention to action-effect prediction; Kok et al., 2012). So,
an examination of whether or not the effects observed during
voluntary actual action (e.g., sensory attenuation) are present
in MI might help to elucidate the neurocognitive mechanisms
underlying MI. If, for example, sensory attenuation effects
are also present in MI, this would strengthen the functional
equivalence hypothesis of simulation theory. Demonstrating
similar effects in both ME and MI would support the idea of
shared representations and mechanisms, but might suggest that
sensory information is also simulated. Consequently, the current
MST framework would need to be extended to account for this
possibility, perhaps borrowing from emulation theory which
promotes the idea that both motor and sensory systems are
simulated (Grush, 2004).
Interestingly, research has raised the possibility that
“attentional effort” (or the motivated allocation of attentional
resources to satisfy cognitively challenging demands; Kahneman,
1973), and its associated physiological component of arousal, may
mediate MI processes. For example, studies have demonstrated
that temporal congruence between actual and imagined
movement performance durations is closest when participants
are in an aroused rather than relaxed state (Louis et al., 2011),
and that the greatest disparities are found when tasks are
performed early or late in the day (Gueugneau et al., 2009) –
times when levels of circadian arousal are lowest (van der
Heijden et al., 2010). As yet, however, the extent of attentional
effort involved during MI in comparison to ME has not been
investigated. In the absence of studies on this latter issue, we
cannot discount the possibility that the demonstrated temporal
incongruence between MI and ME at times of low arousal levels
are due to altered recall, rather than due to attentional processes.
In this regard, the neurochemical norepinephrine associated
with arousal levels can mediate memory retrieval processes
(see, e.g., Murchison et al., 2004). This might provide support
for a grounded theoretical conceptualization of simulation,
whereby simulation involves the re-enactment of multi-modal
representations from memory. In this case, modulated memory
processes might mediate MI ability.
As previously mentioned, the second proposed function of
the simulation process during MI is to monitor the action
simulation activity toward the goal. In the context of MST
and ME, motor representations are considered to operate in a
similar manner to the forward models of computational motor-
control theory (e.g., Wolpert et al., 1995), in that, motor-signal
copies (efferent copies) are used to predict the new sensory
state (i.e., the action outcome) without actually performing the
action (Jeannerod, 1994, 1997). This anticipated new state is
encoded in the action goal representation and its persistent
activation at the neural level provides an internal mechanism
(i.e., without need for external sensory input) for comparing
the unfolding action with the desired action (Jeannerod, 1997).
The goal representation remains active until the desired new
state is achieved. In relation to MI, MST posits that the role
of simulation is “to ‘evaluate’ the feasibility of the action, its
potential consequences and its adequacy with respect to the
anticipated goal” (Jeannerod, 2006a, p. 165). However, MST
does not specifically address the issue of whether or not a
comparator mechanism operates during MI or simulation, for
these evaluation processes – for assessing the adequacy of the
action for achieving the desired goal. If during MI, as MST
claims, the “goal is not reached even though all the conditions
for potentially reaching it are fulfilled” (Jeannerod, 2004, p. 376),
and thereby presumably remains activated, the question arises
as to how imagined actions are terminated and the simulation
mechanism thereby disengaged. This process may be the result
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of either comparator or attentional mechanisms (or both).
Additionally, during MI each step of, for example, a sequential
complex action is subjectively performed, and experienced
as being completed, in relation to the desired action goal.
Although MST claims that action consequences are predicted
via simulation processes, and evidence suggests that awareness
of the kinesthetic feeling of imagined movement comes from
action-effect prediction (Tian and Poeppel, 2010), it is unclear
as to whether subjective awareness is an adequate mechanism
for simulation/imagined action termination. Emulation theory
(Grush, 2004) offers a possible solution to this problem because
it proposes that sensory feedback is also simulated. In this case,
simulated sensory feedback would allow progress monitoring
and control of the imagined action through comparison between
simulated action and its simulated feedback in relation to
the anticipatory representation of desired action effects (e.g.,
Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009). Further, simulated feedback
would also facilitate termination of the imagined action. Overall,
empirical investigation is required to explore the degree to which
MI requires comparator mechanisms for accurate functioning.
If instead, MI employs anticipatory-associative simulations, as
discussed earlier (Hesslow, 2002, 2012), comparison mechanisms
may not be necessary as the simulation process would be fuelled
by previously experienced and learned associations. However,
even in this case, the problem arises as to how exactly the
simulation process (i.e., MI) is terminated. Alternatively, if, as
grounded theories suggest, imagined action performance re-
enacts a previously learned action that is stored in memory,
then, attentional processes that select and inhibit the appropriate
motor aspect of the multimodal representation could oversee
the initial re-enactment process. Then, once underway, the
simulated action would automatically terminate according to
the memory held. Unfortunately, the mechanisms that might
explain how the simulation process is terminated have not been
adequately addressed by empirical studies to date. Accordingly,
research is urgently required to investigate this important
question.
Inhibition of overt movement during MI is considered to be
a function of the simulation process (as delineated earlier in
the paper; Jeannerod, 2001, 2004, 2006a). During MI, inhibition
is a key mechanism that differentiates imagery from actual
execution, as it involves the complete suppression of overt
movement behavior (Ridderinkhof et al., 2011). For cognitive
researchers, inhibition may be defined as “the stopping or
overriding of a mental process, in whole or in part, with
or without intention” (MacLeod, 2007, p. 5). In this sense,
and in relation to MST, inhibition during MI concerns the
withholding of some degree of mental processing so that the
probability of movement execution is reduced. The majority
of studies investigating the inhibitory mechanisms operating
during MI have focused on neural or neurocomputational
substrates (see Ridderinkhof et al., 2011; Guillot et al., 2012b;
Rieger et al., 2016). Literature in this domain has sought to
decipher whether inhibitory processes are, firstly, integrated
into MI processes so that active inhibition is not required (i.e.,
motor commands remain at a subthreshold level), or secondly,
actively implemented during MI to either inhibit all movement
(global inhibition), action-specific movement, or effector-specific
movement (see Jeannerod, 2001; Guillot et al., 2012b; Rieger
et al., 2016). Tentative conclusions from this literature suggest
that inhibitory processes may be tightly coupled with MI
processes to sustain a subthreshold level of motor command
throughout imagined movement (e.g., Jeannerod, 2001; Stinear,
2010; Guillot et al., 2012b). At a cognitive level, this might imply
that during MI, inhibitory processes are built in to the motor
intention (see, Ridderinkhof et al., 2014), and have a role in
guiding motor processes and preventing execution of the motor
program. If inhibitory mechanisms operate at earlier intentional
stages of MI it would be expected that a limb involved in an
imagined movement would be unavailable for actual movement.
Interestingly, Bach et al. (2014) discovered that participants
found it more difficult to respond with a body-part (hand or
foot) when that body-part was concurrently engaged in MI,
and instead typically responded with another body part. The
authors link this to motor-planning processes, involving goal
and action response binding, that reduce the availability of the
body-part for unrelated responses. These findings also support
the idea that inhibitory processes are closely associated with
intentional processes and further suggest that such inhibition
is effector-specific (see also, Rieger et al., 2016). However, it
should be noted that these findings might also be explained by
appealing to attentional mechanisms. Specifically, it is possible
that attentional resources were invested in the MI task, and that
the structural interference arising from resource competition (i.e.,
competition for similar motor systems) prevented participants
from successfully using the same effector for execution. Recall
that MST claims that MI relies on the same mechanisms as ME –
expect that overt movement is inhibited (Jeannerod, 2001, 2004,
2006a). In summary, despite increased research interest in this
topic, little progress has been made in clarifying precisely when
and how (e.g., through intentional or attentional mechanisms)
inhibition is implemented during MI.
Given this impasse, we propose that some insight into
inhibitory mechanisms might be gained from the study of
gestures during speech. According to Hostetter and Alibali
(2008), gestures arise from a combination of language processing
and MI. Specifically, within these researchers’ ‘gestures as
simulated action’ framework, when speakers talk about actions,
they simultaneously engage in simulation or MI of those actions.
Gestures arise if the motor simulations are not inhibited.
Failure to inhibit MI processes is thought to result from
strong neural activation of the motor representations which
arises from action experience (Sassenberg and van der Meer,
2010; Hostetter, 2014). Further, gestures are more likely to
be produced when speaking a word that has strong action
characteristics (Hostetter, 2014). This finding is consistent with
literature that demonstrates the involvement of the motor
system during action-related language (Pulvermüller et al., 2005;
Holt and Beilock, 2006; Hauk et al., 2008; Andres et al.,
2015). Interestingly, gesture research is also compatible with
the claims of grounded theories that an action word may
trigger its multi-modal representation which is simulated to
extract meaning. Gestures would result from a failure to inhibit
motor simulation of the representation. By contrast, MST cannot
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easily account for this semantic-pragmatic interaction during
speech gestures of action words as it claims that simulations
during MI are in a pragmatic format (a ‘how to do’ format;
Jeannerod, 2006a). Within the MST perspective, the word would
activate motor systems after its meaning has been extracted
which would elicit a motor image (Jeannerod, 2006a). Overall,
the nature of inhibition in MI is an under-investigated area
and further research is needed to investigate precisely when
and how inhibitory processes are engaged and controlled
during MI.
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MI RESEARCH
Throughout this paper we have argued that although MI
is a psychological process, its psychological bases remain
surprisingly unclear. Given the existing imprecise determination
of mechanisms of MST, and indeed of other accounts
of simulation, and the poorly understood psychological
mechanisms underlying MI, it seems timely to re-evaluate
approaches to investigating how and under what conditions
MI operates. Recent ideas relating to grounded theoretical
approaches to the intertwined development of higher cognitive
and executive functions and motor control (Pezzulo and
Castelfranchi, 2009; Gottwald et al., 2016) provide promising
directions for MI research.
Before we conclude this section, it may be fruitful to consider
a topic which may enable us to arbitrate empirically between
contrasting predictions from grounded theory and MST. One
such topic is the learning and performance of novel actions.
Grounded theory predicts that performance of novel actions
through MI would not be possible as simulation is regarded
as a mechanism that re-enacts multimodal representations held
in memory (Barsalou, 2008). Consequently, if an appropriate
representation does not exist in memory for a desired movement,
it cannot be simulated, or by association, imagined. Conversely,
regarding MST, learning novel movements through MI appears
quite tenable, as it is claimed that simulation mechanisms
allow imagined action performance by assembling motor
representational elements anew, rather than utilizing complete
action representations that are stored in memory (Jeannerod,
2006a). Some evidence exists that MI positively affects motor
skill learning, for example, after only a brief period of physical
practice – necessary for familiarization and pretesting – (Gentili
et al., 2006, 2010), and even without prior physical practice
(Pascual-Leone et al., 1995; Kraeutner et al., 2016). However,
there is also contradictory evidence that motor learning does
not occur via MI unless there is prior movement experience
(Mulder et al., 2004; Olsson and Nyberg, 2010). Predictive
processing views of MI maintain that motor acquisition through
MI is linked to the extent of experience an individual has
with the particular action (see Ridderinkhof and Brass, 2015).
However, it should be noted that studies have found changes
in brain activity and functional connectivity following MI/MP
(see Pascual-Leone et al., 1995; Lafleur et al., 2002; Jackson
et al., 2003; Debarnot et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2014). Changes
in brain activity following MI might reflect the benefit of
simulation processes in shaping the motor system (action
anticipation) to facilitate subsequent action execution (MST), or
in refining the representational re-enactment process, whereby
simulations are only performed for those components of the
representation that are essentially required for action (grounded
theory).
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Over the past 15 to 20 years, MST has been consistently
invoked in an effort to explain how MI works (e.g., Holmes
and Collins, 2001; Erlacher and Schredi, 2008; Munzert et al.,
2009; Munzert et al., 2015; Gentsch et al., 2016). But does this
theoretical approach provide an adequate theoretical account of
the cognitive mechanisms underlying MI? In an effort to answer
this question, the present article had two objectives. Firstly, it
attempted to clarify the terminology of MST, summarize its key
postulates and to evaluate available evidence cited in support of
them. In addition, it sought to evaluate the degree to which MST
provides a sufficient explanation of the cognitive mechanisms
underlying MI. To this end, key anatomical brain regions
associated with actual and imagined movement were highlighted,
and in support of simulation theory, considerable regional
overlap was identified. However, subtle differences in the neural-
networks underlying MI and ME were evident and emphasize the
importance of understanding MI at different levels of analysis.
Overall, we have argued that MST relies on an underspecified
mechanism – simulation – as the operational characteristics
of the mechanism itself are unclear. Thus, empirical inquiry
and cognitive-level process models that explain precisely how
the simulation mechanism operates during MI are required to
explain, for example, how simulation is initiated, continuously
generated, and terminated, or if it is under constant conscious
control. Further, while MST claims that ME and MI rely on the
same set of mechanisms, few of these are precisely delineated.
Based on Jeannerod’s work, we have suggested that the simulation
process during MI may operate at least three further mechanisms,
namely, attentional mechanisms for the selection and assembly
of motor elements, comparator mechanisms for the monitoring
of imagined action toward a goal, and inhibitory mechanisms
for preventing overt execution during MI. It is apparent from
the research discussed that the psychological architecture of MI
remains poorly understood. Without fully understanding the
cognition underlying MI, other theories emphasizing the reliance
of cognition on sensorimotor activity, such as grounded theory,
or emphasizing simulated sensory feedback, as in emulation
theory, cannot be discounted as more adequate explanations for
how MI works. In this regard, we suggest that an integration of
cognitive, neural and behavioral level research will likely be most
productive in providing comprehensive knowledge of exactly
how MI functions.
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